Antitrust\u27s Unconventional Politics by Crane, Daniel A.
University of Michigan Law School 
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository 
Law & Economics Working Papers 
3-26-2018 
Antitrust's Unconventional Politics 
Daniel A. Crane 
University of Michigan - Ann Arbor, dancrane@umich.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current 
 Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons 
Working Paper Citation 
Crane, Daniel A., "Antitrust's Unconventional Politics" (2018). Law & Economics Working Papers. 153. 
https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/153 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship 
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Law & Economics Working Papers by an authorized administrator 
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 




ANTITRUST’S UNCONVENTIONAL POLITICS 




Antitrust law stands at its most fluid and negotiable 
moment in a generation. The bipartisan consensus that 
antitrust should solely focus on economic efficiency and 
consumer welfare has quite suddenly come under attack 
from prominent voices calling for a dramatically 
enhanced role for antitrust law in mediating a variety of 
social, economic, and political friction points, including 
employment, wealth inequality, data privacy and 
security, and democratic values. To the bewilderment of 
many observers, the ascendant pressures for antitrust 
reforms are flowing from both wings of the political 
spectrum, throwing into confusion a conventional 
understanding that pro-antitrust sentiment tacked left 
and antitrust laissez faire tacked right. 
On the left, the assault on the consumer-welfare-
oriented status quo has migrated from reformist 
organizations like the Open Markets Institute1 and anti-
corporate progressives like senators Elizabeth Warren 
and Bernie Sanders to the House Democratic 
Leadership, which has staked the 2018 mid-term 
 
 †Frederick Paul Furth, Sr. Professor of Law, University of 
Michigan.   
1 https://openmarketsinstitute.org/.  Open Markets was 
affiliated with the left-leaning New America Foundation, until forced 
out over Open Markets’s criticisms of Google, a New America 
patron.  Kenneth P. Vogel, Google Critic Ousted from Think Tank 
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elections on an economic platform including antitrust 
reform as a centerpiece.2  In the Democratic Party’s 
center, the formation of a House Antitrust Caucus3 and 
reform bills introduced in both the House4 and the 
Senate5 underscore increasing political traction to 
jettison the consumer welfare status quo.  The 
Democrats’ “Better Deal” plank asserts that consumers 
are but one of the classes that antitrust should protect, 
with workers, suppliers, and small business taking an 
equal place in the protected class.6 Significantly, the 
document launches harsh criticisms of the past thirty 
years of antitrust enforcement as excessively lax—a 
period over which Democrats ran antitrust enforcement 
just over half of the time.  The Democratic leadership 
has made clear that it does not intend to exclude the 
Clinton and Obama administrations from its criticism, 
that it intends to advocate a major, trans-partisan 
rethinking of antitrust policy.7 
 
2 U.S. House of Representatives Democratic Leadership, A 
Better Deal:  Crack Down on Corporate Monopolies & the Abuse of 
Economic and Political Power, 
https://abetterdeal.democraticleader.gov/crack-down-on-abuse-of-
power/  
3 Tess Townsend, Keith Ellison and the New Antitrust Caucus 
Want to Know Exactly How Bad Mergers Have Been for the American 
Public, http://nymag.com/selectall/2017/12/antitrust-bill-from-
keith-ellison-seek-info-on-mergers.html. 
4 21st Century Competition Commission Act, H.R. 4686, 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/4686; 
Merger Retrospective Act, H.R. 4538, 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/4538. 






7 Chuck Schumer, A Better Deal for American Workers, New 
York Times, July 24, 2017, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/24/opinion/chuck-schumer-
employment-democrats.html (“Democrats have too often hesitated 
from taking on those misguided policies directly and unflinchingly 
— so much so that many Americans don’t know what we stand 
for.”). 
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On the right, President Trump has attacked 
concentrated economic power in big media8 and his 
Justice Department has launched a surprising, 
aggressive challenge to the AT&T/Time Warner vertical 
merger.  Trump’s trustbusting might be dismissed as a 
feature of his idiosyncratic populism or, less charitably, 
abusive vendettas against corporate political foes like 
CNN and Amazon, but the reformist sentiment on the 
right is far from limited to the President.  Similar 
sentiments have been expressed by such diverse 
conservative figures as activist Steve Bannon, who 
wants to turn Google and Facebook into public utilities,9 
conservative economist Kenneth Rogoff,10 and Trump’s 
decided political foe Bill Kristol, who criticizes Robert 
Bork’s consumer welfare standard and proposes a 
significant reinvigoration of the antitrust laws to limit 
the growing power of tech’s Big Five (Amazon, Apple, 
Facebook, Google, and Microsoft).11 The American 
Conservative recently turned with surprising ferocity on 
that conservative icon Bork, asserting that “[w]hereas 
prior generations of lawmakers protected the American 
citizenry as businessmen, entrepreneurs, and growers, 
Bork led a revolution that sacrificed the small producer 
 
8 Trump Says Amazon has ‘a huge antitrust problem,’ Reuters 
(May 13, 2016) https://www.cnbc.com/2016/05/13/trump-says-
amazon-has-a-huge-antitrust-problem.html.; Trump’s comments 





9 Robinson Meyer, What Steve Bannon Wants to do to Google, 
The Atlantic, Aug. 17, 2017 
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2017/08/steve-
bannon-google-facebook/535473/. 
10 Kenneth Rogoff concerned  by the dark side of technology 
revolution, Financial Review, March 9, 2018, 
http://www.afr.com/technology/kenneth-rogoff-concerned-by-the-dark-side-
of-the-technology-revolution-20180308-h0x8n4 





Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2018
Crane – Antitrust’s Unconventional Politics 3/26/201812:48 PM 
   
at the altar of efficiency and cheap goods.?”12 
Standing against the anti-incumbent challengers 
from both political wings is a broad, bi-partisan 
establishment center seeking to defend the consumer 
welfare framework.  Until recently, this establishment 
center seemed far from unified.  Since the rise of the 
Chicago School in the 1970s, antitrust law has been 
contested on terms that seemed generally to track 
right/left political ideology, with those on the left 
favoring more aggressive intervention and those on the 
right more laissez faire.  But the rising tide of calls for a 
radically different version of antitrust has led to a 
circling of establishment wagons around the consumer 
welfare standard.  Left-leaning organizations that once 
led the charge for more aggressive enforcement now find 
themselves defending the consumer welfare idea in 
principle,13 even while calling for more aggressive 
enforcement within that paradigm.  Meanwhile, 
conventionally conservative or pro-business leaning 
organizations continue to defend the consumer welfare 
standard against assaults from their own right flank.14 
This Essay shows that, although unconventional in 
presentist terms, the emerging political dislocations over 
antitrust policy reflect longstanding ideological 
ambiguities about and within the anti-monopoly 
tradition. In particular, the current political fracturing 
 
12 Daniel Kishi, Robert Bork’s America, The American 
Conservative (March 1, 2018), 
http://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/robert-borks-
america/. 
13 See Danny Vinik, Inside the New Battle Against Google, 
https://www.politico.com/agenda/story/2017/09/17/open-
markets-google-antitrust-barry-lynn-000523 (reporting on 
resistance to Open Markets’ assault on consumer welfare standard 
by traditionally left-leaning, pro-enforcement groups like American 
Antitrust Institute and New America Foundation). 
14 See, e.g.¸ Federalist Society  Antitrust & Consumer 
Protection Working Group, https://regproject.org/group/antitrust-
consumer-protection/ (defending consumer welfare standard); U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce, Competition Policy & Antitrust, 
https://www.uschamber.com/competition-policy-antitrust 
(“Antitrust remedies should enhance consumer welfare and make 
sense in an interconnected world.”). 
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over antitrust is best understood by examining three 
ideological friction points that have emerged periodically 
within American history: (1) the ideological ambiguity 
surrounding the association between large scale in 
business and government; (2) the shifting meaning of 
“monopoly” from exclusive grant of government privilege 
to purely private power and a related question about the 
sources of monopoly power; and (3) pragmatic concerns 
about the ability of the capitalist order to survive 
without regulatory interventions to smooth its roughest 
edges.  Taken in the context of these longstanding 
friction points, the strange bedfellow coalitions uneasily 
rising around contemporary antitrust reform aren’t that 
strange at all. 
 
I 
THE IDEOLOGICAL AMBIGUITY OF LARGE SCALE IN 
GOVERNMENT AND BUSINESS 
 
A. Brandeis and Bork as Ideological Touchpoints 
 
Although American antitrust policy has been 
influenced by a wide variety of ideological schools,15 two 
influences stand out as historically most significant to 
understanding the contemporary antitrust debate.  The 
first is a Brandeisian school, epitomized in the title of 
Louis Brandeis’ 1914 essay (subsequently made the title 
of a 1934 collection of his essays) in Harper’s Weekly—
The Curse of Bigness.16  Arguing for “regulated 
competition” over “regulated monopoly,” Brandeis 
asserted that it was necessary to “curb[] physically the 
strong, to protect those physically weaker” in order to 
sustain industrial liberty.17 Brandeis evoked a 
 
15 See generally DANIEL A. CRANE & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE 
MAKING OF COMPETITION POLICY (2016). 
16 Louis D. Brandeis, A Curse of Bigness, Harper's Wkly., Jan. 
10, 1914, at 18. 
17 Louis Brandeis, Shall We Abandon the Policy of Competition? 
In Crane & Hovenkamp, supra n. xxx at 185. On Brandeis’ 
influence in antitrust, see generally Kenneth G. Elzinga & Micah 
5
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Jeffersonian vision of a social-economic order organized 
on a small scale, with atomistic competition between a 
large number of equally advantaged units. His goals 
included the economic, social, and political.18  As 
explained in a dissenting opinion by William O. Douglas 
in the 1948 Columbia Steel case, Brandeis worried that 
“size can become a menace—both industrial and social. 
It can be an industrial menace because it creates gross 
inequalities against existing or putative competitors. It 
can be a social menace— because of its control of 
prices.”19  
The Brandeisian vision held sway in U.S. antitrust 
from the Progressive Era through the early 1970s, albeit 
with significant interruptions.20 Its spirit animates a 
long chain of important cases from Chicago Board of 
Trade21 in 1918 (authored by Brandeis himself) to 
TOPCO in 1972,22 and a string of Congressional reforms 
including the Clayton and Federal Trade Commission 
Acts of 1914, the Robinson-Patman Act of 1938, and the 
Celler-Kefauver Act of 1950. 
The ascendant Chicago School of the 1960s and 
70s threw down the gauntlet to the Brandeisian 
tendency of U.S. antitrust law.  In an early mission 
statement, Robert Bork and Ward Bowman 
characterized antitrust history as “vacillat[ing] between 
the policy of preserving competition and the policy of 
preserving competitors from their more energetic and 
efficient rivals,”23 the latter being an interpretation of the 
Brandeis School. Richard Posner struck a similar note 
 
Webber, Louis Brandeis and Contemporary Antitrust Enforcement, 
33 Touro L. Rev. 277 (2017). 
18 See Jeffrey Rosen, The Curse of Bigness, The Atlantic (June 
3, 2016) (summarizing Brandeisian vision). 
19 U.S. v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 525 (1948) 
(Douglas, J., dissenting). 
20 See, e.g., ELLIS HAWLEY, THE NEW DEAL AND THE PROBLEM OF 
MONOPOLY: A STUDY IN ECONOMIC AMBIVALENCE (1995) (detailing place 
of Brandeisian School among prevailing New Deal ideologies). 
21 Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918). 
22 U.S. v. TOPCO Assoc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972).  
23 Robert H. Bork & Ward S. Bowman, The Crisis in Antitrust, 
65 Colum. L.Rev. 363, 363-64 (1965). 
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in his 1976 book on antitrust, asserting that “the proper 
purpose of the antitrust laws is to promote competition, 
as that term is understood in economics.”24 Chicagoans 
argued that antitrust law should be concerned solely 
with economic efficiency and consumer welfare (more on 
these values in a moment).25 “Bigness” was no longer 
necessarily a curse, but often the product of superior 
efficiency. Chicago criticized Brandeis’s “sympathy for 
small, perhaps inefficient, traders who might go under 
in fully competitive markets.”26  Preserving a level 
playing field meant stifling efficiency to enable market 
participation by the mediocre.27   
Beginning in 1977-78, the Chicago School achieved 
an almost complete triumph in the Supreme Court, at 
least in the limited sense that the Court came to adopt 
the economic efficiency/consumer welfare model as the 
exclusive or near exclusive goal of antitrust law 
(adoption of Chicago School interpretations of consumer 
welfare and policy positions on particular competitive 
practices would occur neither immediately nor 
completely).28 In 1979, citing Bork, the Court declared 
that “Congress designed the Sherman Act as a 
‘consumer welfare prescription.’”29 Over time, the maxim 
 
24 RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 
ix (1976). 
25 ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR 
WITH ITSELF xxx (1978). 
26 Bork, Antitrust Paradox, supra n. xxx at 41. 
27 Bork, Antitrust Paradox, supra n. xxx at 137 (“Any firm that 
operates excludes rivals from some share of the market. Superior 
efficiency forecloses. Indeed, exclusion is the mechanism by which 
competition confers benefits on society. The more efficient exclude 
the less efficient from the control of resources, and they do so only 
to the degree their efficiency is superior.”). Years later, as a paid 
consultant for Netscape against Microsoft, Bork would employ the 
level playing field metaphor affirmatively, asserting that “[t]he object 
is to create a level playing field benefiting consumers. That is what 
antitrust is about . . .”  Robert H. Bork, What Antitrust Is All 
About, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 1998, at A19.   
28 See Crane, Chicago, Post-Chicago, and Neo-Chicago, 76 U. 
Chi. L. Rev. 1911 (2009). 
29 Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979) (citing 
BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX, XXX at 66). 
7
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that antitrust law should protect “competition rather 
than competitors” became canonical.30  Brandeis had 
been displaced by Bork. 
If the last three or four decades of U.S. antitrust 
policy have largely belonged to Bork—at least at an 
ideological level—the Bork vs. Brandeis dichotomy is far 
from settled. The voices at the cutting edge of the rising 
reformist movement—particularly those aligned with the 
influential Open Markets Institute31—explicitly style 
themselves as a “New Brandeis” school in order to re-up 
the historic contest between the Brandeisian and 
Chicago School orders.32 
 
B. The Lingering Shadows of Jeffersonianism and 
Hamiltonianism 
 
Although it is conventional to understand Brandeis’ 
anti-bigness ideology as an aspect of Progressivism 
standing in contrast to Chicago’s big business 
conservatism, the story is historically more nuanced.  
Brandeis’ preoccupation with “bigness” was not limited 
to large corporate scale—he was also deeply concerned 
with large governmental scale generally, and a large 
scale federal government in particular.  As Jeffrey Rosen 
has observed, “[d]enouncing big banks as well as big 
government as symptoms of what he called a ‘curse of 
 
30 E.g., Brooke Goup Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco 
Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 225 (1993) (“It is axiomatic that the antitrust 
laws were passed for ‘the protection 
of competition, not competitors.’”) (citing Brown Shoe Co. v. United 
States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962)). 
31 https://openmarketsinstitute.org/.  Open Markets was 
affiliated with the left-leaning New America Foundation, until forced 
out over Open Markets’s criticisms of Google, a New America 
patron.  Kenneth P. Vogel, Google Critic Ousted from Think Tank 
Funded by the Tech Giant, New York Times, August 30, 2017, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/30/us/politics/eric-schmidt-
google-new-america.html. 
32 David Dayen, This Budding Movement Wants to Smash 
Monoplies, The Nation April 4, 2017; Danny Vinik, Inside the New 
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bigness,’ Brandeis was determined to diminish 
concentrated financial and federal power, which he 
viewed as a menace to liberty and democracy.”33  
Brandeis styled himself a Jeffersonian, and his ideology 
resonated with the Jeffersonian preference for small-
scale yeomanry and localized political organization.34  
In lionizing large corporate scale, the Chicago School 
aligned itself with the Hamiltonian vision for a robustly 
mercantile society grounded on powerful financial and 
economic institutions.  By doing so, Chicago always 
risked alienating the libertarian right, with its affinity for 
Jefferson’s vision for small scale government and 
industrial production.35 Many libertarians have found it 
hard to attack bloated government without also worrying 
about bloated business.  (Witness the rise of the Tea 
Party, which arose in large part as a reaction to 
corporate bailouts). Influential libertarians like Friedrich 
Hayek saw a role for antitrust law in curbing 
monopolistic abuses because they understood 
unfettered corporate power as a threat to personal 
liberty.36 
The divide between the competing Hamiltonian and 
Jeffersonian ideals on organizational scale and their 
implications for efficiency and liberty thread through 
antitrust’s intellectual and ideological history, often 
disrupting conventional political alignments.  Teddy 
Roosevelt, a deep admirer of Hamilton, was comfortable 
with large scale in both government and business.  Far 
from a “trustbuster,” Roosevelt opposed breaking up 
Standard Oil, viewing large aggregations of capital as 
inevitable and necessary—so long as superintended by a 
 
33 Rosen, supra n. xxx. See also JEFFREY ROSEN, LOUIS D. 
BRANDEIS: AMERICAN PROPHET 1 (Yale Univ. Press 2016). 
34 A. LIEF, BRANDEIS: THE PERSONAL HISTORY OF AN 
AMERICAN IDEAL 478 (1936). 
35 ALBERT J. NOCK, MR. JEFFERSON (1983). 
36 Ellen Frankel Paul, Hayek on Monopoly and Antitrust in the 
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strong federal government.37  Roosevelt’s affinity for 
large scale government and business earned him with 
epithet of “socialist.” 38  That charge was hyperbolic, but 
not directionally implausible.  In the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries, American socialists looked 
with suspicion on the antitrust laws because they 
viewed the rise of the Gilded Age trusts as salutary 
stepping stones to government appropriation of the 
means of production and industry.39 Socialist 
Presidential candidate Eugene Debs, himself the 
defendant in an antitrust prosecution, argued: 
“Monopoly is certain and sure. It is merely a question of 
whether we will be collectively owned monopolies, for the 
good of the race, or whether they will be privately owned 
for the power, pleasure and glory of the Morgans, 
Rockefellers, Guggenheims, and Carnegies.”40  
Conversely, influential conservatives in antitrust’s 
formative era favored aggressive antitrust enforcement 
as an antidote to the simultaneous aggrandizement of 
government and business.  In the crucible election of 
1912, William Howard Taft argued against Progressive 
proposals to create a new Federal Trade Commission, 
asserting that his administration’s aggressive 
enforcement record demonstrated how traditional 
prosecutorial and common law processes could obviate 
the need to create new large governmental organizations 
to combat big business.41 Taft’s pro-enforcement saber 
rattling reached such a crescendo that Wall Street began 
 
37 See Letter from President Theodore Roosevelt to Arthur B. 
Farquhar (Aug. 11, 1911), in THEODORE ROOSEVELT: LETTERS AND 
SPEECHES 652, 652 (Louis Auchincloss ed., 2004). 
38  MARTIN J. SKLAR, THE CORPORATE RECONSTRUCTION OF 
AMERICAN CAPITALISM, 1890–1916, at 344–46 (1988). 
39 See generally Henry Rand Hatfield, The Chicago Trust 
Conference, 8 J. POL. ECON. 1 (1899) (reporting that socialists 
favored consolidation as a means to nationalization). 
40 Eugene Debs, A Study in Competition, in Appeal to Reason 
(May 28, 1910), reprinted in Flehinger, at 162–63. 
41 Daniel Crane, Progressivism and the 1912 Election, in THE 
MAKING OF COMPETITION POLICY:  LEGAL AND ECONOMIC SOURCES, supra 
note xxx, at 104, 105.  
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to wonder whether Roosevelt might be the candidate 
more sympathetic to their interests. 42 
The New Deal, too, saw the Democratic Party 
equivocate between contending Jeffersonian and 
Hamiltonian impulses on the question of governmental 
and business scale.  The first New Deal period—from 
1933 to early 1935—was dominated by the National 
Industrial Recovery Act, which encouraged a 
centralization of both governmental and industrial 
power.43  Brandeis led the charge on the Supreme Court 
to strike down the NIRA in 1935, warning the White 
House that the Court would not tolerate continued 
centralization of business or governmental power.44 
From 1935 until the beginning of the war, the New Deal 
administration followed a policy of aggressively 
Brandeisian antitrust enforcement.45  Then, facing a 
need to mobilize big business for the war effort, the 
administration abruptly shifted course and embraced a 
“business commonwealth” model of partnership between 
big government and big business.46   
After the war, the perception that industrial 
concentration in Germany and Japan had fueled the rise 
of fascism contributed to a two-decade period of 
intensive antitrust enforcement—particularly against 
mergers—launched by the Celler-Kefauver Act of 1950.47 
Here again, the ideology of the anti-monopoly movement 
was ambiguous in conventional right/left terms.  The 
anti-monopolist Senator Kefauver warned that the 
consequence of further industrial concentration would 
 
42 Id. at 375. 
43 Hawley, supra n. xxx. 
44 Shortly before voting to strike down the NIRA in the 
Schechter Poultry and Panama Refining decisions, Brandeis 
conveyed the following message to the White House: “This is the end 
of this business of centralization, and I want you to go back and tell 
the President that we're not going to let this government centralize 
everything. It's come to an end.” PETER H. IRONS, THE NEW DEAL 
LAWYERS 104 (1982). 
45 Hawley, supra n. xxx. 
46  Id. 
47 Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. Pa. 
L. Rev. 1051 (1979). 
11
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be government take-over, and that could lead either to 
fascism, on the one hand, or socialism or communism, 
on the other.48 Other proponents of the act argued that 
the antitrust laws were “one of the greatest bulwarks 
against communism,” and that the rising tide of 
industrial concentration was driving the country toward 
“collectivism.”49  It is no coincidence that the most anti-
consolidationist statute in American history was passed 
during the period of the Red Scare. 
The ambiguity in the relationship between corporate 
scale and governmental scale has translated into a 
historical ambiguity in the politics of antitrust 
enforcement. Just as the two major contemporary 
political parties each blend contradictory Hamiltonian 
and Jeffersonian elements, so too antitrust ideology has 
not neatly tracked left/right dichotomies.  On a 
statistical basis, civil antitrust enforcement by the 
government peaked during the conservative Nixon and 
Ford administrations.50  The Chicago School rode the 
wave of Ronald Reagan’s decoupling of the curse of 
bigness—bigness was a curse in the government only, 
not in business.  But Chicago’s decoupling of the 
ideological aversion to large scale in government and 
business is not inevitable and may be, in historical 
perspective, anomalous.  As historian Richard 
Hofstadter has written, American feelings about large 
organizational units in government and business have 
generally tracked in parallel.  “From its colonial 
beginnings through most of the nineteenth century . . . 
Americans came to take it for granted that property 
would be widely diffused, that economic and political 
power would be decentralized.”51 The gradual public 
acceptance of the rise of big business in the twentieth 
century is attributable in part “to the emergence of 
 
48 96 Cong. Rec. 16,452 (1950). 
49 Herbert Hovenkamp, Distributive Justice and the Antirust 
Laws, 51 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1, 25 (1982). 
50 DANIEL A. CRANE, THE INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF ANTITRUST 
ENFORCEMENT 37 (2011). 
51 Richard Hofstadter, What Happened to the Antitrust 
Movement, reprinted in Crane & Hovenkamp, supra n. xxx at 227. 
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countervailing bigness in government and labor.”52  
Historically, it is no anomaly that small-government 
conservatives would find common ground with 
Brandeisian progressives in resenting the growth and 
power of large-scale industrial firms, which are not so 




THE SHIFTING MEANING OF “MONOPOLY” AND CONTESTATION 
OVER ITS SOURCES 
 
A. What Is a “Monopoly?” 
 
The ideological valence of the anti-monopoly 
principle is ambiguous in contemporary left/right terms, 
owing in large part to a historical shift in the meaning of 
the word “monopoly,” particularly in its popular and 
pejorative senses. Is a monopolist a private firm that 
corners a market through nefarious shrewd tactics? If 
so, the law’s anti-monopoly response codes “regulatory” 
and “interventionist” in right/left terms.  Or is a 
“monopoly” a cronyist intervention by the state to 
prevent free market competition?  In that case, the anti-
monopoly principle codes as “deregulatory” and “free 
market.”  Both of these senses of “monopoly” have been 
used historically, and their contemporary manifestations 
remain tangled. 
The first sense of “monopoly”—of purely private 
market power—has a long-standing historical 
resonance. Legal regulation of private monopoly and 
unfair competition  reportedly extends back as far as the 
Code of Hammurabi.53  A primordial antitrust case 
against grain dealers appears in fourth century B.C. 
Athens.54 One finds an anti-monopoly sentiment 
 
52 Id. at 238. 
53 FRITZ MACHLUP, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF MONOPOLY (1952). 
54 Lambros E. 
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expressed in ninth century B.C. Chinese thought on the 
ground that it increased prices to consumers.55  A 
similar sentiment appears in early Islamic law56 and in a 
fifth century decree of the Byzantine Emperor Zeno and 
the Justinian Code.57  A generally moralist anti-
monopoly strand runs through the Christian tradition 
from the medieval scholastics to the Protestant 
reformers.58 The earliest common law cases vitiating 
private monopolies date from the fourteenth century.59 
On the other hand, constitutional historians 
recognize a longstanding anti-monopoly tradition—
defined by such attributes as prohibitions on 
governmental cronyism and special grants of economic 
privilege—in Anglo-American jurisprudence.60  Debates 
over corporate chartering and monopoly pervaded the 
Founding Era and continued through the Jacksonian 
period and into the corporate liberalizations of the late 
nineteenth century.61  Anti-monopoly themes played an 
important role in many of the landmark cases of U.S. 
constitutional law on such matters as the limits of 
 
55 CHEN HUAN-CHENG, THE ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES OF CONFUCIUS 
AND HIS SCHOOL 534 (1911). 
56 Arvie Johan, Monopoly Prohibition According to Islamic Law: 
A Law and Economics Approach, 
https://jurnal.ugm.ac.id/jmh/article/viewFile/15904/10513 
("Whoever withholds food (in order to raise its price), has certainly 
erred!").   
57 S.P. Scott, 13 The Civil Law 120 (1932) (translating book IV, 
title 59 of the Code of Justinian) (prohibiting monopolies and cartels 
upon pain of confiscation and banishment). 
58 See Kenneth Elzinga & Daniel A. Crane, Christianity and 
Antitrust, in CHRISTIANITY AND ECONOMIC REGULATION (Daniel A. Crane 
& Samuel Gregg, forthcoming Cambridge University Press). 
59 William L. Letwin, The English Common Law Concerning 
Monopolies, 21 U. Chi. L. Rev. 355, 356-58 (1954). 
60 See, e.g., Kenneth Lipartito, The Antimonopoly Tradition, 10 
U. St. Thomas L.J. 991 (2013); Steven C. Calabresi & Larissa C. 
Leibowitz, Monopolies and the Constitution: A History of Crony 
Capitalism, 36 Harv. J.L & Pub. Pol’y 983 (2013); Michael 
Conant, Antimonopoly Tradition under the Ninth and Fourteenth 
Amendments: Slaughter-House Cases Re-Examined, 31 Emory L.J. 
785 (1982). 
61 Daniel A. Crane, Antitrust Antifederalism, 96 Cal. L. Rev. 1 
(2008). 
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federal power,62 the impairment by states of obligations 
of contract,63 and the reach of the Reconstruction 
Amendments.64  Indeed, the constitutional-democratic 
sense of the anti-monopoly tradition predates the 
American political order, with deep roots in the British 
common law.  Sir Edward Coke argued that all 
monopolies were against Magna Carta because they 
stood against liberty and freedom,65 and the Case 
Against Monopolies asserted Parliamentary jurisdiction 
over the grant of monopolies.66 
Throughout much of the Anglo-American anti-
monopoly tradition, “monopoly” primarily denoted a 
governmental grant of an exclusive privilege—a “letter 
patent” in the sense of the classic common law case: The 
Case Against Monopolies.67  Until the late nineteenth 
century, the American anti-monopoly tradition was 
concerned primarily with governmental cronyism and 
exclusive privilege.  As late as 1878, Thomas Cooley 
devoted the principal thrust of his essay on limits to 
state control of private business to the problem of state-
granted monopoly, turning only in the last few pages to 
the subsidiary problem “[o]f monopolies not created by 
the legislature.”68 
Over time, however, the primary legal meaning of 
“monopoly” has shifted from the government-granted to 
the purely private. This shift became apparent in U.S. 
 
62 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
63 Proprietors of Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of Warren 
Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837)). 
64 Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873).  
65 EDWARD COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES 
OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND: CONCERNING HIGH TREASON, AND 
OTHER PLEAS OF THE CROWN AND CRIMINAL CAUSES 181 
(Lawbook Exchange 2002) (1644)). 
66 Darcy v. Allen (The Case Against Monopolies), 11 Coke 84, 
77 Eng. Rep. 1260 (K.B. 1603). 
67 See Edward S. Mason, Monopoly in Law and Economics, 47 
YALE L. J. 34, 44 (1937) (discussing shift in meaning of word 
“monopoly” from exclusion of others from the market by a sovereign 
dispensation in favor of one seller” to “broad sense of restriction of 
competition.”). 
68 Thomas M. Cooley, Limits to State Control of Private 
Business, reprinted in Crane & Hovenkamp, supra n. xxx, at 67. 
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antitrust law in 1943, when, in Parker v. Brown,69 the 
U.S. Supreme Court held the Sherman Act inapplicable 
to anticompetitive structures created by state regulation.  
Parker grew out of the Supreme Court’s post-1937 
constitutional jurisprudence rejecting Lochner-era 
judicial scrutiny of regulatory schemes impairing 
property or contract rights.70 Just as the post-1937 
constitutional dispensation would avoid second-
guessing state regulatory judgments in favor of judicially 
preferred economic theories, so too the courts would 
reject efforts to use the Sherman Act to the same effect 
(to the dismay of conservatives, who favored the 
judiciary as a bulwark against over regulation).   
From one perspective, Parker stood the meaning of 
“monopoly” on its head.71  Whereas, the primary 
meaning of “monopoly” in the Anglo-American tradition 
had been a governmental grant of exclusive privilege—
an interference with the natural rights of other market 
participants—that primary sense of “monopoly” was now 
to be excluded altogether from the Sherman Act’s anti-
monopoly legal regime.  Only purely private 
monopolies—the second sense of the word discussed 
above—would be covered by antitrust. 
The Parker doctrine of state action immunity from 
antitrust has not developed to immunize state regulation 
from Sherman Act preemption as strongly as Parker’s 
language would suggest, and the doctrine’s evolution 
continues.72  In the push-and-pull over the doctrine’s 
boundaries, it has largely been advocates of the Chicago 
School’s consumer welfare approach that have argued 
 
69 Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). 
70 Daniel A. Crane & Adam Hester, State-Action Immunity and 
Section 5 of the FTC Act, 115 Mich. L. Rev. 365 (2016). 
71 Richard A. Epstein, Symposium, The Proper Goals of 
Antitrust: When Public and Private Interests Collide, 9 LOY. 
CONSUMER L. REV.. 112, 125 (1997) (“What happens 
[under Parker] is that this legal regime marks a complete inversion 
of the proper approach. State-sponsored cartels in the aftermath of 
the New Deal legitimation are more permanent and more dangerous 
than privately-operated ones, but they are given complete immunity 
from the antitrust act.”). 
72 Crane & Hester, supra n. xxx. 
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for narrowing state action immunity on the view that 
states systematically distort competitive processes for 
the benefit of rent-seekers.73  This simultaneously pro-
antitrust and deregulatory perspective tracks that 
strand of the anti-monopoly tradition accusing the 
government as culprit. 
 
B. Are Private Monopolies the Product of 
Governmental Intervention? 
 
This ambiguity over the meaning of “monopoly” and 
its attendant legal and policy implications cashes out 
also in legal and economic discourse over the sources of 
monopoly power.  A neo-classical economic view, today 
associated with Chicago School ideology, holds that 
markets are contestable and that any monopoly power 
gained through anticompetitive means is quickly eroded, 
but with one important exception:  governmentally 
created entry barriers.74  If regulation and governmental 
 
73 Id. at xxx (arguing for more preemptive role for FTC Act over 
anticompetitive state regulations that harm competition and 
consumer welfare); Frank H. Easterbrook, Antitrust and the 
Economics of Federalism, in COMPETITION LAWS IN CONFLICT: 
ANTITRUST JURISDICTION IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 189-213 (Richard A. 
Epstein & Michael S. Greve, eds, 2004) (proposing modification to 
Parker immunity doctrine to curb excesses of state anticompetitive 
regulation); Frank H. Easterbrook, The Chicago School and 
Exclusionary Conduct, 31 Harv. J. Law & Public Pol’y 439, 446 
(2008) (discussing Robert Bork’s concern about use of government 
as agent of exclusion); Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. 
Greve, Introduction, in COMPETITION LAWS IN CONFLICT, supra, 
at 1, 13 (describing the Parker doctrine as enabling mutual 
exploitation of citizens by the states). 
74 See Stephen A. Siegel, Understanding the Lochner Era: 
Lessons from the Controversy Over Railroad and Public Utility 
Regulation, 70 Va. L. Rev. 187, 202-03 (1984 (examining 
neoclassical view that only monopolies created by law were 
durable); Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom 129-31 (2d ed. 
1982) (discussing problem of government-created labor 
monopolies); Howard P. Marvel, Hybrid Trade Restraints: The Legal 
Limits of a Government’s Helping Hand, 2 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 165, 
180 (1983) (“Government may or may not be the source of 
all monopolies; it is clearly at the heart of a substantial number 
of monopolies.”);  Bork, supra n. xxx at 347-64 (examining 
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favoritism are the only important sources of durable 
monopoly power, then one potential policy response is 
not to worry about privately acquired monopoly—
essentially, to turn the Parker state action immunity 
regime on its head and only police state-granted 
monopolies.  But there is another possibility flowing 
from the opening premise, which is to hold that any 
observed instances of genuinely durable monopoly 
power must be owing to some seen or unseen 
governmental distortion.  In this latter view, when what 
at first blush may seem to be purely private monopoly 
power persists over time, there must be some underlying 
governmental distortion accounting for it.  Then, even 
committed libertarians should favor antitrust 
intervention to terminate the monopoly. 
This view is not hypothetical; it explains some of the 
right’s historical affinity for antitrust enforcement 
despite the right’s otherwise laissez faire predilections. 
The clearest case in point is the 1983 consent decree 
breaking up of AT&T.  How did the largest anti-
monopoly corporate break-up in history occur at the 
hands of the Reagan Administration and its decidedly 
Chicago School Justice Department?  The answer lies in 
Assistant Attorney General Bill Baxter’s conviction that 
AT&T was exploiting its status as a regulated monopolist 
to stifle competition.75 What has come to be known as 
“Baxter’s law” posits that rate-regulated monopolists 
may extract monopoly profits from vertically integrated 
markets without running afoul of the “one monopoly 
profit” theorem.76  Suspecting government regulation as 
the deep source of AT&T’s persistent monopolistic 
 
predation through governmental process, which Bork described as 
a serious and growing problem). 
75 Lawrence A. Sullivan & Ellen Hertz, The AT&T Antitrust 
Consent Decree: Should Congress Change the Rules?, 5 High. Tech. 
L. J. 233, 238 (1990). 
76 William F. Baxter, Conditions Creating Antitrust Concern 
with Vertical Integration by Regulated Industries--“For Whom the Bell 
Doctrine Tolls,” 52 Antitrust L.J. 243 (1983); see generally Tim Wu, 
Intellectual Property, Innovation, and Decentralized Decisions, 92 Va. 
L. Rev. 123, 139 (2006). 
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behavior, the conservative Reagan Administration was 
willing to break it up. 
Similar suspicions that Big Tech companies like 
Google and Facebook are the monopolistic beneficiaries 
of subtle governmental cronyism show up today on the 
political right.77  That Big Tech tends to be associated 
politically with the Democratic Party only furthers these 
perceptions.78 Those inherently suspicious of 
governmental interventions in markets may understand 
Big Tech as the unnatural spawn of governmentally 
granted privilege and private greed.  Conversely, those 
more sympathetic to governmental intervention may find 
nothing alarming about the multiple ways in which Big 
Tech appropriates governmental benefits through such 
vehicles as intellectual property law, government 
subsidies, or the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.  But 
these matters divide the left as well.  The Open Markets 
Institute was forced out of the progressive-leaning New 
America Foundation over Open Markets’ criticisms of 
Google.79 In light of the contestable boundaries of the 
public/private divide and the shifting meaning of 
monopoly, it is not surprising to see political alliances 
fraying over antitrust reform.   
III 
PRAGMATIC CONCERNS OVER ANTITRUST’S ALTERNATIVES AND 
CAPITALISM’S SURVIVAL 
 
A final reason that the politics of antitrust 
sometimes confound conventional left/right divides has 
to do the pragmatic sense that some regulatory 
interventions may be necessary to preserve capitalism 
 
77 E.g., Seton Motley, Democrats Want Big Government Crony 
Socialism—Why Are Some Republicans Giving It to Them?, 
https://www.redstate.com/diary/setonmotley/2015/07/08/democ
rats-want-big-government-crony-socialism-republicans-giving/. 
78 See Ryan Grim, Steve Bannon Wants Facebook and Google 
Regulated  Like Utilities, 
https://theintercept.com/2017/07/27/steve-bannon-wants-
facebook-and-google-regulated-like-utilities/. 
79 Supra n. xxx. 
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politically, and that antitrust may be the least 
objectionable one.  This “antitrust or else” perspective 
has characterized the politics of antitrust from the 
beginning. 
The conventional view that the Congress intended 
the Sherman Act seriously to undermine the trusts is 
balderdash. “[T]he Republican Party, in control of the 
51st Congress, was ‘itself dominated at the time by many 
of the very industrial magnates most vulnerable to real 
antitrust legislation.’”80  A more realistic view is that the 
51st Congress passed the Sherman Act to avert more 
radical reforms.  Speaking on the Senate floor in 1890, 
Senator John Sherman warned his brethren, many of 
whom were controlled by the trusts, that Congress 
“must heed [the public’s] appeal or be ready for the 
socialist, the communist, and the nihilist.”81  Sherman 
thus conceived of his eponymous antitrust statute as 
politically necessary to diffuse more radical political 
movements—as a sort of Band-aid on capitalism.   
The idea that antitrust legislation and enforcement 
are necessary accommodations to public demand has a 
long pedigree in both conservative and more progressive 
circles.  Writing in 1914, William Howard Taft described 
the Sherman Act as “a step taken by Congress to meet 
what the public had found to be a growing and 
intolerable evil.”82  Notably, Taft did not own the public’s 
concern himself, nor attribute such a concern to 
Congress.  Similarly, Theodore Roosevelt was relatively 
unconcerned with the trusts personally, but, “saw the 
trust problem as something that must be dealt with on 
the political level; public concern about it was too urgent 
to be ignored.”83   
Beyond the concern that, absent antitrust, 
 
80 WILLIAM LETWIN, LAW AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN AMERICA: THE 
EVOLUTION OF THE SHERMAN ACT (1965) (quoting MERLE FAINSOD & 
LINCOLN GORDON, GOVERNMENT AND THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 450 
(1941)). 
81 See also 21 Cong. Rec. 2460, 2460 (1890). 
82 WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT, THE ANTI-TRUST ACT AND THE SUPREME 
COURT 2 (1914). 
83 Hofstadter, supra n. xxx at 232. 
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capitalism itself might succumb to reformist pressures, 
there is a more modest possibility that, absent antitrust, 
political pressures would lead to overregulation.  
Antitrust and administrative regulation are 
conventionally viewed as alternatives to address market 
failures.  From the Reagan Administration to the 
Financial Crisis of 2008, the overall arc of American law 
involved simultaneous deregulation and relaxation of 
antitrust enforcement.  If popular dissatisfaction with 
the economic status quo grows, demand might grow to 
pull either the regulatory or antitrust lever.  Those 
ideologically committed to a light governmental hand on 
the market might prefer the antitrust alternative. 
It is hard to judge at any given moment how much 
political support for antitrust intervention is motivated 
by genuine concern over monopoly and competition, and 
how much of it derives from the fact that, in the face of 
popular demand for a governmental cure to a perceived 
evil, it is often easier to delegate the solution to antitrust 
than to propose a regulatory solution.  From the 
Sherman Act forward, however, it is certain that 
antitrust has often been deployed as a foil to more 
interventionist forms of regulation.  The ideological and 
political implications of that move are complex and not 




Antitrust is back on the menu.  Given the ebb-and-
flow patterns of antitrust enforcement in American 
history, that should come as no surprise.  Nor should it 
be surprising that the pressures for enhanced antitrust 
enforcement are coming from both wings of the political 
spectrum, as is the defense of the incumbent consumer 
welfare regime.  Despite the appearance of a 
conventional right/left divide over antitrust enforcement 
since the 1970s, in broader historical perspective the 
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